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Abstract
Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) is a promising emerging technology that enables
road safety, traffic management, and passengers and drivers comfort applications. Many
applications require multi-hop routing; position-based routing (PBR) is a well-recognized
routing paradigm that performs well in the vehicular context to enable these applications.
However, there are many security challenges and various routing attacks which may prevent
the deployment of PBR protocols.
In this study, we propose a novel security scheme called ESPR to secure PBR protocols
in VANETs. ESPR considers both digital signature and keyed Hash Message Authenti-
cation Code (HMAC) to meet the unique requirements of PBR. In ESPR, all legitimate
members share a secret key. ESPR scheme applies a novel probabilistic key distribution
to allow unrevoked members to update the shared secret key. Furthermore, it defines
a set of plausibility checks that enables network members to detect and avoid PBR at-
tacks autonomously. By conducting security analysis and performance evaluation, ESPR
scheme demonstrated to outperform its counterparts in terms of communication overhead
and delay while achieving robust and secure operation.
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Vehicular Communication Systems (VCSs) are an emerging technology that employ wire-
less communication networks to enable vehicles to communicate with one another, and
with a fixed infrastructure. VCSs are a direct response to the increasing demands of In-
telligent Transportation Systems (ITS) services and the expectations of the automotive
industry. Vehicular communication is designed for a wide range of applications related to
safety, traffic management, and passenger comfort.
Safety applications are the main motivation for the development of VCSs. VCSs are
used with the goal of spreading accurate data quickly and reliably, in order to avoid acci-
dents and loss of life. In VCSs, vehicles help to avoid accidents through cooperation: they
inform one another about their own source-of-risk behaviour, such as highway merging,
they also disseminate emergency warning messages when a hazardous status is detected,
such as slippery road conditions. A VCS also improves road safety by enabling traffic lights
and signs to communicate with vehicles.
In addition to these safety applications, VCSs are also employed in a variety of ITS
traffic management applications. Road traffic management applications focus on improv-
ing traffic flow in order to avoid traffic congestion, to reduce travel time, and to utilize
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the transportation infrastructure effectively. Examples include adaptive traffic lights that
change according to the status of the traffic in an intersection, and direction information
based on real-time traffic information.
A third type of VCS applications relates to the comfort and well being of passengers;
transferring files between vehicles, accessing the Internet during trips, finding a nearby
point of interest, and disseminating advertising messages about a nearby business are all
examples of VCS services. These services have been included in response to passenger, car
manufacturer, or service provider requests.
Vehicular networks have attracted the attention of both research and industrial commu-
nities, which is reflected in the interest of governments and standardization organizations.
For example, European car manufacturers have instituted the Car-to-Car Communication
Consortium (C2C-CC) [1] to improve road safety and efficiency, and the U.S FCC (Federal
Communication Commission) has approved a 75 MHz spectrum for vehicular networks
[2]. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) also supports vehicular
communication with the IEEE 1609 family of standards for wireless access in vehicular
environments (WAVE) [3].
The previous works present a variety of approaches that employ various technologies
for the implementation of VCS. In fact, some car manufacturers support their vehicles
through Internet access via cellular networks. However, with respect to cost and latency,
using cellular networks is not the best way to build a VCS. In many proposals, IEEE 802.11
is deployed for a VCS. However, IEEE 802.11 has a limited radio range and needs numerous
base stations to keep the vehicles connected to the infrastructure. Using Vehicular Ad Hoc
Network (VANET) with On-Board Units (OBUs) and Roadside units (RSUs), and enabling
multi-hop routing through vehicles appears to be the more effective method, but it also
entails significant challenges.
2
1.1 Research Motivations and Objectives
Security is a major challenge that can affect VANETs deployment. As a special case of
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), VANET inherits all of MANETs security concerns
while introducing new security challenges specific to its characteristics. In VANETs, at-
tackers can inject, forge, replay, and drop messages in order to violate information integrity,
authenticity, user privacy, and system performance. Therefore, reliable security solutions
should be designed to achieve user authentication, information authentication (data in-
tegrity), and non-repudiation, which are identified as primary security requirements.
Multi-hop routing is a key function in VANET. The literature shows that position-
based routing (PBR) outperforms other routing schemes in the vehicular context. However,
PBR protocols are vulnerable to many routing attacks, such as: routing loop, sinkhole,
wormhole, and sybil attacks. Routing attacks can be launched even when the security
requirements are met; therefore, security protocols should consider these attacks in their
design.
In literature, public key infrastructure (PKI) has been adopted in the vehicular com-
munication environment in order to meet security requirements. However, applying a PKI
scheme into the PBR context is more challenging, because PBR packets have two types
of data fields: mutable and immutable fields. Neither hop-by-hop nor end-to-end dig-
ital signature-based authentication is sufficient to secure the multi-hop routing process.
Security protocols should be carefully designed to secure PBR services.
The most noticeable work that addresses the PBR security problem considers a scheme
with two digital signatures on each packet, in order to secure both mutable and immutable
data fields [4]; however, this scheme fails to meet the hard delay constraint for some
VANET’s applications, and introduces a high communication overhead to the network.




In this thesis, a comprehensive solution is provided to secure PBR protocols in VANETs.
The major contributions are:
• Identifying PBR security challenges and attacks
• Identifying PBR security requirements
• Proposing a cryptographic security scheme to achieve, efficiently, the primary security
requirements
• Proposing a corresponding key management scheme to manage secure distribution,
revocation, and key renewal processes
• Evaluating the impact of different routing attacks on the network performance
• Proposing a plausibility-checks set in order to enable vehicles to detect and avoid
malicious behaviours autonomously
1.3 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents an introduction to
VANETs and PBR, a literature review of their security systems, and recent related work;
Chapter 3 defines the proposed security scheme, ESPR; Chapter 4 presents a security
and efficiency analysis of ESPR, in addition, it includes a simulation-based performance
evaluation of ESPR; and Chapter 5 summarizes the thesis, as well as commeting the major
contribitions, and outlining some feasible future work.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
2.1 Vehicular Ad Hoc Network
Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) is an emerging wireless ad hoc network that enables
vehicular communication. In general, Ad-Hoc networks are decentralized networks that do
not depend on preexisting infrastructure, e.g., routers, and the routing process is dynamic
where each node participates in routing. In VANETs, each vehicle is equipped with a
networking device, On-Board Unit (OBU), to enable V2V. Similar devices, Roadside units
(RSUs), are spread along the road sides to allow V2I. Figure 2.1 shows the general structure
of VANET.
In addition to general wireless and ad hoc characteristics, such as decentralizing and
short transmission range, VANET also has its distinctive characteristics. VANET is a
large-scale network characterized as a network that is frequently disconnected or parti-
tioned, and that has a highly dynamic topology due to the high level of mobility of the
vehicles. However, in VANET, the mobility of the vehicles can be modeled and predicted
because vehicle movements are constrained by streets and roads. Two main entities com-
prise VANETs: OBUs and RSUs that have sufficient computation, energy, and storage
5
Figure 2.1: Structure of VANET
capabilities. Moreover, VANETs have hard delay constraints, specially for safety applica-
tions. These characteristics make VANET a unique class of networks; however, they also
introduce many challenges that must be resolved.
The first challenge is network reliability because the highly dynamic nature of the
topology of a VANET threatens its reliability. Achieving reliable communication requires
an efficient medium-access control (MAC) protocol that can adapt to a VANET environ-
ment in terms of mobility and interoperability. In addition, efficient routing protocols and
dissemination algorithms are needed in order to deal with such a large-scale, frequently
partitioned network that has different applications with different priorities for different
vehicles densities.
Security is another key challenge. Solutions are required to ensure secure communica-
tion between legitimate vehicles and authorized services while having little or no impact
on the ease-of-use of the services. Security solutions should be acceptable to users, e.g.,
drivers, car manufacturers, and service providers, with respect to cost, overhead, and ef-
ficiency. Moreover, the overhead provided by security solutions should not violate the
latency constraint of a VANETs applications.
6
(a) Safety warnings (b) Traffic information (c) Toll Road Payment
Figure 2.2: Examples of VANET applications
VANET is thus a promising network that is expected to revolutionize transportation
systems and society by enabling remarkable applications with respect to safety, traffic
management, business services, passenger comfort, and other areas. Some of the VANET
applications are shown in Figure 2.2. However, its unique characteristics give rise to many
challenges related to its commercialization. The lack of a fixed infrastructure and the high
mobility of the vehicles are the properties that require the most extensive effort in order to
solve problems related to communication reliability, packet routing, and network security.
2.2 Position-Based Routing (PBR) in VANET
Routing is one of the key enabling mechanisms for multi-hop applications in VANETs.
However, due to vehicles high degree of mobility, designing an efficient routing protocol for
VANETs is very challenging. The traditional topology-based protocols and source routing
protocols, such as AODV [5]and DSR [6], require finding routes and maintaining routing
tables and do not perform well with the highly dynamic topology of VANETs. Position-
based routing (PBR) is a promising routing paradigm, which depends on the availability
of geographic location information about the vehicles. Since each vehicle in VANET is
equipped with a Global Positioning Systems (GPS) receiver, it can accurately determine
its geographic location. Studies show that PBR outperforms topology-based routing in
7
urban and highway scenarios[7].
Vehicular communication projects such as CarTalk2000 [8] and NoW [9] have introduced
PBR to cope with a vehicular network environment. PBR is suitable for VANET as it does
not require prior determination of a routing path. In PBR, each vehicle is aware of its own
geographical location. Nearby vehicles share this location information in order to perform
data routing. A routing decision is determined at each intermediate node with respect
to the position of the destination, the position of vehicles within the transmission range
(neighbour nodes), and the forwarding strategy of the protocol. PBR protocols thus consist
of the following components:
• Beaconing: Each vehicle should periodically broadcast its geographic location and
identity. Based on the beacons received, each vehicle maintains a table of the loca-
tions of the neighbouring vehicles.
• Location service: Before a vehicle can send a message to another vehicle, it should
determine the geographic location of the destination vehicle through location queries
and responses. A location query that includes the identity of the destination is
broadcast by the source vehicle in a well-defined manner (e.g., it is rebroadcast until
a maximum number of hops is reached). The source waits until it receives a location
response that provides the updated location of the destination. The location reply
can be generated either by the destination itself or by a location server.
• Forwarding strategy: Forwarding a message from node to node in PBR follows a
forwarding strategy. Different PBR protocols operate according to different strate-
gies and consider a variety of information required by their specific strategy. For
example, Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) [10], one of the fundamental
PBR protocols, combines greedy routing with face routing as forwarding and recov-
ery strategies. In greedy forwarding, packets are forwarded to the vehicle with the
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physical location closest to the destination. However, when greedy fails and reach a
local minimum, face routing, or perimeter algorithm, is used. GPSR requires only the
positions of the destination and the neighbouring vehicles, while other protocols may
employ map information, traffic density information, the trajectories of the vehicles,
information about speed and direction, etc., in their forwarding strategy.
The routing header of a packet in PBR should include the identity, timestamp, and position
of the source, destination, and sender vehicles, where the source and destination are the end
nodes, and the sender is the last intermediate packet-forwarder. PBR supports unicast and
geocast message forwarding Figure 2.3 shows two examples of PBR routing packets, where
the routing header consists of two types of fields: immutable which are not modifiable by
intermediate nodes, and mutable which are modifiable by intermediate nodes. In geocast
message forwarding, the destinations identity is replaced by the geographic coordinates of
the targeted area.
Figure 2.3: Examples of Position-Based Routing Packets
When a vehicle wants to send a message to another vehicle, it determines the position
of the destination vehicle through location services. Then, the source vehicle, based on the
stored location table for the neighboring vehicle, forwards the message to the next vehicle
according to the routing protocol forwarding strategy. This process continues until the
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message reaches its destination.
2.2.1 PBR Protocols
Many PBR protocols have been proposed for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). These
protocols can be classified into three main categories [7]. The first category includes di-
rectional flooding protocols, according to which packets are flooded on multiple paths
restricted by a defined area. For example, Location Aided Routing (LAR)[11]was one of
the first PBR protocols that floods packets in a rectangular zone that extends from the
source to the destination. The second class of PBR protocols uses hierarchical approaches
in their forwarding strategy. Terminodes[12] and grid routing [13] are examples of these
protocols. The last category is greedy routing, whereby packets are forwarded on only a
single path and nodes are selected according to the closest-to-the-destination rule. Most
PBR protocols proposed for VANET belong to this category.
Greedy routing suffers from the local minimum problem. GPSR [10] solved this problem
by combining greedy routing with face routing and provided successful results in open area
simulations. However, GPSR has many problems and fails in some situations. Fan Li and
Yu Wang discuss some of these situations in [7]. Greedy Perimeter Coordinator Routing
(GPCR) [14] is another greedy protocol that relies on routing at junctions; its forwarding
strategy depends mainly on the fact that vehicles at junctions follow a natural planar
graph. Because it uses greedy routing, GPCR employs a repair strategy in order to avoid
the local minimum problem. Geographic Source Routing (GSR)[14] is an anchor-based
source routing protocol. The destination location is determined, and the best route is then
computed in the form of a route vector that contains a list of anchors or fixed geographic
points between the source and the destination. Packets are forwarded from one anchor to
another using a greedy scheme until the packet is received by the destination.
Spatial Awareness Routing (SAR) [15] is a map-based source routing protocol. SAR
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depends on a GSR protocol whereby the best route is selected with respect to the city map,
and the path in the form of selected junctions is attached to each packet, which is finally
forwarded from one node to another using GSR. Connectivity Aware Routing (CAR) [16]
is a similar protocol that adds a connectivity maintenance stage to the routing scheme.
As with SAR, CAR first determines the destination location and then attaches a proper
path to the header for each packet. During the stage in which the route is computed,
this protocol broadcasts short messages in order to discover connectivity, and it also uses
velocity vector information.
Position-based protocols that use traffic information give better levels of performance:
higher delivery rates and relatively less delay. Traffic information helps vehicles predict the
density of the nodes and the partitioning of the network along a variety of routes. A-STAR
[17], MDDV [18], and SADV [19] are examples of this type of protocol. A-STAR (Anchor-
based Street and Traffic-Aware Routing) combines both SAR for awareness and Global
State Routing (GSR) for routing. It uses traffic density information to add weights for
path selection based on the premise that more traffic leads to better network connectivity.
In addition, it suggests a strategy for avoiding the packet reaching nodes with no neighbours
(local optimum) by marking such a specific street temporarily as a zero-weighted street
(out of service).
MDDV ( Mobility-Centric Data Dissemination for VANET ) is another trajectory-
based protocol. It is a geographically opportunistic forwarding scheme based on source
node routing. However, the authors of this protocol relied on static network information
and assumed that it is very difficult to access real-time traffic information. They use
the number of lanes per street in a map as a weighting factor that might indicate traffic
density for that street. MDDV uses greedy forwarding in order to forward packets to
the next junction and introduces an opportunistic approach in order to achieve a better
delivery rate. Every node receives a packet and forwards that packet if it will move it
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toward its destination. Each packet includes its generation time and only newer messages
are subject to forwarding. SADV (Static Node-Assisted Adaptive Routing Protocol for
VANETs ) uses static ad hoc nodes at intersections in order to improve the data delivery
rate. The roles of these nodes are to store packets temporarily until a vehicle moving
toward the destination enters the intersection and to collect real-time information about
the density of nodes in different paths in order to make better routing decisions.
In addition to maps and information about node density, some protocols assume that
more information is available for vehicle routing, such as velocity vectors. The Motion
Vector (MoVe)[20] scheme introduced the idea of benefiting from knowledge of the velocity
vector, route, and destination of the carrier vehicle and then, depending on this infor-
mation, the node (vehicle) determines the best moment to forward the packet to another
vehicle that is closer to the destination. A carrier vehicle uses hello and response messages
in order to obtain information about its neighbours. The Geographical Opportunistic rout-
ing protocol for VANET (GeOpps) [7] is a recent position-based routing protocol. Based
on a concept similar to that in MoVe, it uses geographical information from navigation
systems, assumes prior knowledge of a vehicles (carriers) path, and then calculates the
best moment to forward the packets. GeOpps employs a delay-tolerant approach, and its
delivery rate is better than either the greedy routing or MoVe protocols.
2.3 Security and Privacy in VANET
Providing secure communication is a major challenge in VANET that can impact its de-
ployment. Reliable security solutions are required in order to secure both communication
between participants and service access. These security mechanisms should be able to cope
with a VANET environment and also be acceptable to VANET participants: passengers,
car manufacturers, service providers, etc. Security mechanisms should also be based the
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premise that safety information should not be denied to any vehicle but that the system
should not be open to alteration or infiltration by an attacker. Another consideration is
that some VANET services need to be accessible only to authorized users (e.g., on-road
payments).
Cooperative vehicle behaviour is another important concern with respect to VANET
security. Because ad hoc networks in general require node cooperation, security mecha-
nisms should be designed to encourage cooperation and to detect any selfish behaviour.
In VANET, some vehicles are uncooperative by dropping messages or by not providing
their information (e.g., position information in PBR) in order to conserve their resources
(computation, power, bandwidth, etc.) or for security and privacy reasons. Privacy is a
major concern for drivers and a major challenge for designers. Especially for private ve-
hicles, identity privacy, or anonymity, should be guaranteed. Privacy mechanisms should
guarantee that the shared transmitted information does not enable traceability.
Thus, successful deployment of a VANET requires that privacy and security be consid-
ered in the design. A comprehensive security architecture is required in order to support
VANET at the required level of security without deploying additional infrastructure or dis-
turbing the ease-of-use of its services. Such architecture is expected to ensure that VANET
operates efficiently with respect to trust, authentication, access control, robustness, and
secure service access while preserving user privacy.
2.3.1 VANET Security and Privacy Threats
As in any other network, message delivery in VANET is vulnerable to security threats.
VANET attackers can be described according their attributes: active or passive, internal
or external, rational or malicious, and independent or coordinated [2]. The types of attack
can also be classified according to the following categories:
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• Denial of service (DoS):
DoS denotes a scenario in which an active attacker tries to bring down the network (or
part of it), partition it, make services unavailable, or in some cases, cause accidents.
Radio jamming and overwhelming the network by message injection are two examples
of DoS attacks. In message dissemination scenarios, dropping packets selfishly is also
considered a DoS attack.
• Bogus information dissemination (BID):
An attacker can send bogus information to clear the road or to create congestion.
Falsified warnings, for example, might cause accidents. Many PBR attacks involve
the sending of falsified position information, and forged identities are used in im-
personation attacks. In BID scenarios, the attacker generates wrong information or
replays previous messages.
• Privacy disclosure:
Privacy issues relate to who is talking to whom, the content of private messages,
services being used, sites being visited, and the location of private vehicles. An
attacker can listen passively to a channel or actively persuade users to be a part
of their communication route, such as with wormhole and sinkhole attacks. The
attacker can then eavesdrop on active sessions to extract sensitive information. In
addition, monitoring traffic and disclosing the identities of drivers can facilitate their
traceability.
2.3.2 PBR Attacks
In PBR-related attacks, the goals of the attacker include creating or avoiding traffic con-
gestion, obtaining privileges that belong to others, causing accidents, or denying service
(DoS). Attackers replay, forge, inject, or alter packets in order to achieve their goals. The
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following are the primary types of PBR attacks in VANET:
• Routing loop attacks:
An attacker can launch this attack by taking wrong routing decisions, where it passes
the packet back to one of the previous forwarders. Another way to launch this attack
is that the attacker forges its position to appear closer to the destination causing other
nodes to select the attacker as their next hop. Then, the attacker passes any received
packet to one of the previous nodes. The routing loop attack causes the packet to
bounce in a loop, and hence, preventing the packet from reaching its destination.
• Wormhole attacks:
Two attackers can establish a high speed private connection between them to capture
packets from one location and replay them in a different location. The aim of the
attacker in this attack is dominating the routing paths to drop packets and partition
the network or for eavesdropping purposes.
• Sinkhole attacks:
The attacker claims a different position to appear as the next forwarder to a common
target, e.g., an RSU, to dominate the routing path, and then, drops the packets.
• Sybil attack:
The attacker pretends to be multiple vehicles by sending a variety of bogus beacons.
A Sybil attack can be used to create traffic congestion or to divert traffic from the
attackers route.
• Impersonation attacks:
By replaying beacons or forging identities, the attacker pretends to be another vehicle
in order to obtain its privileges.
• Packet modification: The attacker changes the content of the packet, e.g., a forwarder
changes the destination area of a geocast warning message.
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Figure 2.4 shows some examples of PBR attacks.
Figure 2.4: Examples of PBR Attacks
2.3.3 PBR Security Requirements
To prevent the potential PBR threats described above, a well-developed security scheme
should take into consideration the following requirements:
• Service availability:
DoS attacks that cause the network to be unavailable must be prevented or at least
reported. The PBR security scheme should be able to take into consideration any re-
source depletion at the routing level, such as a routing loop attack or packet injection
attacks.
• Message integrity:
Messages should be routed without unauthorized modification by an intermediate
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forwarder. Mutable fields, which contain the IDs for the current node along with
any extra information required by the protocols, should be updated in an authorized
manner and delivered unaltered to the next node, while the immutable fields should
be delivered to the destination without any modification.
• Source authentication:
The originator of a message should be legitimate and authentic so that the infor-
mation delivered can be trusted and impersonation should be impossible. It is not
sufficient to ensure only that the origin of the message is a legitimate node. Orig-
inator authentication is also required so that any legitimate user can be identified
and excluded, based on compromising or inappropriate behaviour (user traceability).
Moreover, the routing process should be conducted only among legitimate users in
order to enhance delivery and avoid routing attacks.
• Source non-repudiation:
The originator of a message must be prevented from denying the creation of the mes-
sage. For example, nodes which cause accidents by disseminating falsified information
or by depleting the network should not be able to deny their misbehaviour.
• Protocol efficiency:
An efficient security scheme should consider both communication overhead, i.e.,
packet size, and end-to-end latency, and should ensure that VANET constraints are
not violated. For example, end-to-end latency has an upper bound of 100 msec for
safety messages, as identified in [2].
2.3.4 PBR and Privacy
In PBR, nodes periodically send beacon messages that contain their identifiers and precise
positions and that breach the privacy of information about their location. Attackers that
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are eavesdropping for beacons can then trace a node or a driver. Location services could
also be used to disclose locations and violate privacy. Anonymization techniques were
proposed early on in order to enhance privacy in mobile ad hoc networks. In VANET,
temporary pseudonyms together with the deployment of a public key infrastructure (PKI)
have been applied in order to preserve a users privacy, e.g., in [21]. In [22], the impact of
pseudonym changes on PBR was investigated. The results of the analysis and simulation
show that pseudonym changes affect network performance and increase the packet loss
rate, especially with short pseudonym change intervals and scenarios involving low traffic
density.
For RSUs along roadsides, fixed service stations, and non-private vehicles, privacy is not
an issue. While privacy is a major concern for private vehicle drivers, privacy concerns have
not prevented the wide deployment of cellular networks, automatic teller machines (ATMs),
and wide acceptance of the Internet [23]. With respect to the promising performance of
PBR, some studies consider privacy a secondary requirement and orthogonal to PBR.
Thus, while privacy is not highlighted in the current work, privacy schemes could be a
complementary aspect.
2.4 Related Work
Security in VANET has attracted a sustained effort from vehicular communication projects,
standardization organizations and security researchers. As government-supported consor-
tiums, the CAR 2 CAR Communication Consortium [1] in Europe and DSRC [3] in the
United States, in particular the P1609.2 group, have put prominent effort in vehicular
communication. Other projects have also contributed to defining security prototypes or
providing security solutions. For example, the SEcure VEhicular COMmunication (SEVE-
COM) project [24] focuses on defining security requirements for vehicular communication
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and implementing corresponding solutions. The NoW (Network on Wheels) project [9] is
another vehicular communication project interested in data security.
Although a number of studies have been conducted, the domain of VANET security
is still young, and many issues are still unresolved. Industrial projects and academic
researchers have provided significant contributions. This literature review presents related
research to PBR security. Several perspectives are included: the general design of a security
scheme that satisfies the security requirements; solving the problem of providing falsified
position information in PBR; and securing PBR in VANET.
2.4.1 Security Design
In addition to the standard drafts and commercial projects efforts, a number of studies have
significantly enriched the domain of VANET security. Raya etal. in [2] and Papadimitratos
etal. in [4] have presented a wide view of VANET security. They provided threat analysis
and adversary models and from them deduced security requirements and security mod-
els appropriate for VANET. The results of their work are general, rather than detailed,
security and privacy solutions. Comprehensive schemes and frameworks have also been
proposed, such as[25], [26], and [4]. Most researchers support a public key infrastructure
(PKI) as a method of satisfying the requirements associated with VANET security. Group
signatures[26] and pseudonyms [25] have also been proposed as a means of protecting users
privacy.
In [25], bilinear mapping is used to implement an efficient pseudonym PKI scheme
(EPPKI) in order to provide security and privacy in VANET. With EPPKI, to preserve
privacy, each node is supplied with only a master key and a master certificate, from which
it then generates traceable pseudonyms and pseudonymous certificates to be included in its
communication. The security protocol requires each node to sign each outgoing message
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and to verify each incoming message. In other words, EPPKI can be classified as a hop-
to-hop authentication scheme, and it fails to address multi-hop routing security.
GSIS [26], also based on bilinear pairing, is another notable comprehensive scheme
for safeguarding VANET security and privacy. In GSIS, group signatures for OBUs and
identity-based signatures for RSUs have been proposed in order to maintain security and
privacy. A message received from an OBU can be verified by its signature; so that the
receiver can determine whether that OBU is legitimate. However, coverage of multi-hop
routing is also lacking in GSIS.
Other research in this area is devoted mainly to analyzing possible attacks or to ad-
dressing particular attacks and providing corresponding security mechanisms. In [2], the
focus was on an attacker model and specific VANET attacks. In [27], an attack tree was
provided for assessing both hardware and software threats through the communication
system NoW. In addition, some studies have provided solutions for specific security issues,
such as a Sybil attack or selfish behaviour. Most of the solutions proposed with respect
to these two types of attacks are based on cooperative monitoring of node activities and
the exchanging of information extracted by means of reputation systems or credit-based
mechanisms.
2.4.2 Falsified-Position Countermeasure
Because PBR was proposed mainly for wireless sensor networks and mobile ad hoc net-
works, many position verification schemes have been developed. In general, position verifi-
cation methods can be classified as either infrastructure-based and infrastructure-less, au-
tonomous, and cooperative schemes or as schemes that require or do not require dedicated
hardware [28]. The schemes that have been developed can thus be described according to
some of these attributes.
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Most infrastructure-based mechanisms were originally proposed for sensor networks and
then deployed for VANET. In these methods, infrastructure devices such as base stations
are deployed together with some fundamental rules for positioning for the purposes of
verifying locations. Verifiable multilateration [29] and triangulation [30] are examples of
this category: the position is determined by the distance measurements between the vehicle
and some reference nodes or base stations. The principles on which these schemes are based
include the measurement of distance and signal angles based on specified parameters, such
as time of arrival, signal strength, and the angle of the signal. These methods introduce
additional infrastructure cost to VANET.
In autonomous schemes, each node independently verifies the position claimed by the
sender in the packet received. Most autonomous schemes depend on some form of plau-
sibility check in order to guarantee that the position claimed is plausible. For example,
plausibility checks have been proposed in [31] and include checking to determine whether
the position claimed is within a plausible transmission range and located on a roadway.
On the other hand, cooperative schemes require nodes to exchange information with other
nodes in order to verify information received about their neighbours position. For example,
in [32] two directional antennas are used to locate vehicles positioned in front of the node
and behind it. When they share this information, vehicles in the region obtain a more
accurate view of the temporary topology. Reputation systems are another form of cooper-
ative scheme cite2010reputation, in which any participating node has a reputational value
that increases based on its cooperation with other nodes and decreases when it misbehaves.
2.4.3 Secure PBR for VANET
Only a few studies have addressed the problem of securing position-based routing in
VANETs, such as in [4], in which Harsch etal. proposed a hybrid signature scheme for
securing PBR in VANETs by applying hop-by-hop (HbH) and end-to-end (E2E) authenti-
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cation together with plausibility checks. In the HbH signature scheme, each node signs the
packet and forwards it to the next one. The next forwarder then verifies the senders sig-
nature, removes the signature, updates the mutable fields in the header, signs the packet,
and resends it. In contrast, an E2E signature scheme does not require the signature of
the forwarder: only the originator of a packet signs its immutable fields and forwards it.
Every subsequent forwarder verifies the originators signature, updates the mutable fields,
and forwards the packet.
An HbH signature scheme is not sufficient for protecting the process of multi-hop rout-
ing. HbH does not provide the end receiver with a guarantee of data integrity, source
authentication, or nonrepudiation. It also fails to protect the message delivery process
from PBR threats such as a sinkhole attack. The E2E signature scheme, on the other
hand, does meet the requirements for primary security, data integrity, source authentica-
tion, and nonrepudiation. However, an E2E system does not provide security for mutable
fields, which makes the scheme highly vulnerable to PBR attacks and selfish behaviour.
For the hybrid signature scheme, the source of the message signs on to both mutable and
immutable fields. Each forwarder then verifies the digital signatures of both the originator
and the previous forwarder, updates the mutable fields, and replaces the last signature
with its own. Used in combination with plausibility checks, this scheme supports PBR
protocols with the level of security required because the primary security requirements are
satisfied, and packets are forwarded through authentic nodes.
An alternative incremental signature scheme is described in [4], where each intermedi-
ate forwarder verifies the previous signatures, copies the mutable field into the end of the
packets, updates the mutable fields with the current information, and adds its signature
for the whole packet to the signature chain. This strong scheme enables both forwarders
and the final destination to obtain a larger view of the network. However, from a network
perspective, it adds unnecessary overhead and delay, which may affect the functional-
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ity of VANET. Table 2.1 shows the cryptographic operations performed in each of the
above schemes: G represents signature generation, V represents the verification of both
the attached certificate and the signature on the packet, and n represents the number of
intermediate forwarders.
Table 2.1: Cryptographic Operations for Different Security Alternatives
Authentication Method Source Forwarder Destination Total operations
Hop-by-Hop G G+V V (n+1)*(G+V)
End-to-End G V V G+(n+1)V
Hybrid 2G G+2V 2V G+(n+1)*(2V+G)
Incremental G G+(nprev+1)V (n+1)V (n+1)*(G+V) +
∑n
k=0 kV
2.5 Identified Research Challenges
None of the previous works provides an efficient and comprehensive solution to secure PBR
protocols in VANETs. Although the previous section has conducted distinguish studies on
VANET’s security, there are still several open problems including the following:
2.5.1 Security-Performance Tradeoff
Applying PKI with excessive use of digital signature, as in [4], introduces both more de-
lay for the cryptographic operations and a larger packet size, which significantly affect
the performance of the network. An efficient security scheme that introduces less security
overhead is required. Therefore, deploying faster security tools and an appropriate sig-
nature scheme, if any, is preferred. Selecting a digital signature scheme includes tradeoff
between signature generation and verification delay and the corresponding communication
overheadwhich should be considered in designing a security scheme. As multi-hop routing
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requires securing both end-to-end and hop-by-hop, security operations may be performed
at each hop along the path, which make the tradeoff between security and efficiency very
critical.
2.5.2 Suppressing Selfish Behavior
Multi-hop routing relies on the cooperative behaviour of forwarders. Selfish nodes may
want to save their resources by not serving as relays for others. When a selfish node
decides not to cooperate with others to deliver their packets but still uses them to send
and receive its own messages, the network performance will be degraded. Therefore, routing
protocol should consider trustworthy cooperative nodes in its forwarding strategy. Selfish
and misbehaving nodes should also be excluded from the network. These routing services
are major security research challenges and should be considered in designing an efficient
security scheme.
2.5.3 Key Management
A comprehensive security scheme that uses public or symmetric key should provide a cor-
responding key management system. Key management includes generating, distributing,
exchanging, updating, and revocating keys. It is considered a security research challenge
in VANET with respect to some VANET’s concerns such as scalability, interoperability,
backward compatibility and forward secrecy.
2.6 Summary
VANET gained extensive interest in academia and industry due to the insistent demand of
users including drivers, transportation systems designers, and car manufacturers. VANET
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is one of the most promising technologies that enable VCS applications. These applications
vary in purpose from safety applications to comfort applications. Applications include, but
not limited to, warning messages such as accident warnings, congestion warnings, change
lane warnings, and hazardous road status warnings, traffic management applications such
as interactive traffic lights and adaptive traffic signs, or application related to passengers
comfort such as file sharing and e-mail and internet access.
As many of these applications require multi-hop routing, routing protocol is key element
in VANET system. PBR scheme is recommended for VANET as PBR protocols performs
well in VANET’s environment. In PBR, if a node wants to send a packet to another node,
it first determines its location by location service, and then forward the packet toward
that location. Forwarding process varies from protocol to another, but relies mainly on the
information provided by neighbouring nodes.
Securing the process of PBR is a key research challenge in VANET. Applying PKI is
a well-recognized solution to satisfy the primary security requirement for the end points.
However, securing multi-hop routing includes both end-to-end and hop-by-hop security.
Security schemes for PBR should consider security solution for one hop and multi-hop
routing and resist PBR attacks. The design of such scheme should observe some security-
efficiency tradeoff.
Only few work have addressed PBR security problem. Most comprehensive frameworks
considered either end-to-end or hop-by-hop authentication which is not sufficient for multi-
hop security. On the other hand, many studies focused on detecting falsified position
information to improve PBR efficiency and detect some PBR attacks. The most notable
work to secure PBR in VANET is given in[4] where the authors apply a hybrid signature
scheme in PKI environment. This scheme provides the required level of security on the
cost of communication and transmission overhead.
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Chapter 3
ESPR: Efficient Security Scheme for
Position-Based Routing in Vehicular
Ad hoc Networks
ESPR is a novel security ware designed by the author with the goal of efficiently securing
position-based routing (PBR) protocols efficiently. It employs cryptographic tools and a
set of plausibility checks to meet the required security conditions and to enable vehicles to
detect and avoid PBR attacks autonomously. In this chapter, the ESPR model is explained
in detail: first, a preliminary section introduces some important concepts, followed by
an overview of the model, then details of the ESPR functions, the corresponding key
management scheme is then defined and the plausibility check set is described.
3.1 Preliminaries
This section describes the system model under consideration, and introduces basic security
concepts, which are important in understanding the developed scheme.
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3.1.1 System Model
As shown in Figure 3.1, the system under consideration consists of a Trusted Authority
(TA) and a number of nodes. The TA is responsible for providing certificates and issuing
secret and public keys to all legitimate nodes in the network. In addition, the TA is
considered responsible to detect any compromised node, revoke its certificate and keep
other nodes informed and up-to-date. It is assumed that the TA is owned and operated by
a government or trusted institution, that does not threaten the users privacy and security.
Moreover, the TA has sufficient computation and storage capabilities for the required tasks.
The nodes in the system are either Roadside Units (RSUs) or On-Board Units (OBUs).
RSUs are fixed units distributed throughout the entire network. They are connected to
the TA and can communicate securely with it. OBUs are wireless devices embedded in
vehicles in order to enable them communicate with one another or with RSUs. Both
RSUs and OBUs are considered network nodes that have sufficient power, computation














Figure 3.1: The System Model
27
The system model is primarily a public key infrastructure (PKI) system. The TA issues
certificates and keys for legitimate network members in order to secure their communica-
tion. In case of a compromise, the TA distributes a revocation message to revoke the
certificates and keys of the compromised node by the means of revocation lists. Legitimate
nodes do not have sufficient incentives to disclose security materials, e.g., security keys,
certificates, etc., to the revoked nodes.
The adversary model considers a variety of attackers with different goals and abilities.
Attackers are willing to receive, modify, retransmit, inject, delete, or forge messages. Inter-
nal and external adversaries are considered; however, attackers with directional antennas
and attacks launched below routing level (e.g., channel jamming at the physical layer) are
not considered in this system.
ESPR supports unicast, geocast, and broadcast transmissions and their applications.
It considers both one-hop applications, such as some warning messages, and multi-hop
application, such as file transfer between non-neighbours. The details and the different
approaches of the location service are not considered as it is orthogonal to the secure
routing problem.
3.1.2 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
As the system model is a PKI system, it is important to select an appropriate Public-
Key Cryptosystem (PKCS). Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC) is a PKCS that provides
public-key cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields.
ECC has been deployed for Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)[33]. ECC
is recommended in VANET context [2] with respect to both signature size and processing
time overhead. The details of elliptic curve algebra are beyond the purpose of this thesis.
The ECDSA has many advantages over other digital signature algorithms[2]. The bit
size of ECDSA can be smaller with respect to the public-key, certificate, and signature
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sizes. The length of the ECDSA public-key is about twice the security level. For instance,
to achieve security level of 80 bits ECDSA requires a public-key with length of only 160 bits,
whereas Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [34] requires 1024-bit public-keys to achieve
the same security level. The signature size of ECDSA is 4t where t is the security level in
bits. ECDSA takes Tmul to sign a message and 2 Tmul to verify it, where Tmul is the time
required to perform a point multiplication on an elliptic curve [35]. ECDSA is adopted in
the VANET IEEE 1609.2 standard as the employed signature scheme.
3.1.3 Hash Function and Hash Chains
A hash function is a mathematical function that converts large, variable-sized data into a
small, fix-sized hash value. A hash function has the following properties:
• Forms a unique image of the message; it should not be possible to deterministically
find another message that creates the same hash value
• Designed in such a way that as small a change as one bit in the message will produce
unpredictable changes of the hash value bits; i.e., every bit of the hash value changes
with a probability of 0.5
• Can be applied to any size of message and produce a fixed size hash value
• Easy and efficient to compute but is computationally infeasible to invert
Hash function allows for the detection of message modification. Keyed hash function
is used to provide both data integrity and message authenticity. Thus, it called Hash-
based Message Authentication Code (HMAC). Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is designed
to implement hash function. SHA-1 [36] produces 160-bit hash value and supports a
cryptographic strength of 80 bits. The key of HMAC can be of any size as it can be hashed
to produce a key compatible with the length of the algorithms block size.
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A hash chain is a successive application of a hash function (h) to a value v to produce
a chain of irreversible values {v0, v1, · · · , vj}, where v0 = v, vi = h(vi−1) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ j, as









Figure 3.2: Hash Chain
3.2 ESPR: An Overview
ESPR uses both cryptographic primitives and logical checks to secure the process of PBR.
It uses digital signature on the mutable fields to achieve End-to-End authentication, non-
repudiation, and data integrity. Moreover, it uses HMAC on the mutable fields to secure
Hop-by-Hop communication, where legitimate users always share a common key. ESPR
proposes a corresponding key management scheme for key initialization, revocation, and
updating processes. Logical checks, or plausibility checks, are proposed to increase the
scheme’s robustness.
3.2.1 System Initialization
At the initialization phase, the required security materials are prepared by the TA and
securely loaded into each node. New nodes can join the network any time by loading these
security materials into their systems. Network members may need to periodically reload
their security materials. Under the PKI system environment, the TA should prepare the
following:
• A set of private-public key pairs to be used by the nodes to sign their messages.
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• A set of certificates. Each key pair is associated with a corresponding certificate
signed by the TA. The certificate includes the public key, user identity, and a prede-
termined validity period.
• A set of secret keys, which are used to manage the HMAC shared key. This set will be
referred as the secret key pool KP . KP has l different keys, i.e., KP = {ki|1 ≤ i ≤ l}
• Secret key (kg), which is used as a shared secret key between legitimate nodes.
• Selection of a hash function h.
• A set of hash chain values V = {vi|0 ≤ i ≤ j} , where j is large enough to accom-
modate the number of revocation processes that occur during the life-time of the
network.
Before each node joins the network, it should be loaded with the following:
• A set of private-public key pairs and corresponding certificates with predetermined
validity periods. This set is used to achieve End-to-End authentication, data in-
tegrity, non-repudiation, anonymity, and traceability by the TA.
• A set of secret keys Ru consisting of m keys randomly selected from the key pool




Beaconing messages are periodical one-hop broadcast messages that include nodes identities
and locations to enable PBR functions. In ESPR, nodes update their location tables only
31
based on the receive beacons, where each node insets its information, appends its certificate
and a timestamp (time of packet generation), signs the entire message using its private key
corresponding to the attached certificate, and attaches this signature. When a node receives
a beacon, it cryptographically verifies the source’s signature and certificate. It also applies
some plausibility checks on the information carried by the beacon, e.g., time and location.
Hence, routing tables have plausible information provided by legitimate neighbours, which
helps to take better routing decisions and to avoid routing attacks. One-hop messages,
other than beacons, follow the same principles.
3.2.3 Destination Location
Location service is one of the main PBR services. In location service, a node sends a multi-
hop query message to obtain the destination location. In literature, different approaches
have been proposed for location service, e.g., using trusted location servers. The sender
waits until receiving a location response. Both location queries and location responses are
multi-hop messages. Therefore, securing multi-hop transmission secures the location ser-
vice. However, ESPR does not discuss the details and the different approaches of location
service as it is considered independent to the secure routing problem. In ESPR analysis
and evaluation, it will be assumed that the destination location is known.
3.2.4 Multi-hop Forwarding
Many unicast and geocast VANETs applications require multi-hop forwarding to deliver
messages to their destinations. In ESPR, the source of a message signs the payload and
the immutable fields in the header after attaching its certificate and a timestamp. This
provides authentication and non-repudiation to the end nodes and maintains the data
integrity for the carried information. The source and each intermediate forwarder selects
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the next hop, from the registered neighbours in its routing table, based on the routing
strategy of the routing protocol.
The mutable fields are not protected by the source’s signature as they are modifiable
at each intermediate hop. Each forwarder updates these fields and computes a message
authentication code (MAC) on both the mutable fields and the source’s signature using kg.
This achieves authentication between intermediate nodes and guarantees mutable fields
integrity. Upon receiving a packet, a recipient verifies the MAC and the source’s signature
and certificate. The property of fast verification of MAC helps to improve the network
performance and avoid some routing attacks as will be discussed later. Figure 3.3 shows
the general structure of the ESPR packet.
Figure 3.3: General Structure of the ESPR Packet
3.3 ESPR: Function Model
ESPR can be described in terms of its major functions. In this section, a deeper view
and more details of ESPR are provided: the security fields added by ESPR are discussed
and a corresponding message format is suggested, the proposed approaches to secure out-




The general format of ESPR packet was introduced in Figure 3.3. With respect to selecting
an 80-bits security level, the size of ECDSA public key and the corresponding signature are
160 bits (20B) and 320 bits (40B) respectively. The certificate includes the node identity
(or pseudonym), its public key, validity period, and the TA’s identity and signature. A
certificate size of 125B is considered.
The content of MAC field is the result of HMAC function with inputs of mutable field
contents and the source’s signature. The size of this field is 160 bits (20B) with respect to
the security level and the hash algorithm (SHA-1).
The mutable fields are related to the routing protocol. It includes some control fields,
such as the routing mode field in GPSR, and other routing information such as last sender
information and number of hops. The immutable fields are the fields in the original packet
header that include unmodifiable information such as the source and the destination nodes.
Payload data and source’s signature and certificate are immutable.
The size of the payload field varies and depends mainly on the corresponding applica-
tion. For example, it is recommended for safety messages to have a small size, e.g. 100B.
An ESPR packet is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
3.3.2 Securing Outgoing Messages
Algorithm 1 Shows the ESPR procedure that secures outgoing messages including beacons,
originated one-hop or multi-hp messages, and received messages that have to be forwarded.
It describes the general process from a security point of view and can be easily applied to
any specific PBR protocol.
In ESPR, only legitimate nodes are allowed to participate in the network services.
Each member shoud have a valid certificate in order to generate a message, and kg in order
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Figure 3.4: ESPR Message Format
to forward a message. Network members embers sign messages that they originate and
append their signatures and certificates. However, they do not need to sign messages that
they receive for routing purposes. Instead, they only calculate and append HMAC using
kg as shown in steps (24-30) of Algorithm 1.
3.3.3 Incoming Messages Verification
ESPR applies two types of verification on a received message: cryptographic verification
and plausibility checks. The cryptographic verification processes verify nodes legitimacy
and data integrity, via the described cryptography tools, while the plausibility checks verify
the content of the message to make sure that it carries plausible information. The complete
set of plausibility checks are presented in section 3.5.
Received messages are either beacons, one-hop unicast messages targeting the recipient,
broadcast or geocast messages, or multi-hop unicasted messages. In ESPR, any received
message should be cryptographically verified. A recipient of a message verifies its sources
certificate and signature; it also verifies its HMAC in the case of multi-hop messages.
Certificate verification requires the availability of the TA’s public-key. Signature verifica-
tion requires the source’s public-key, which is included in its certificate. Finally, HMAC
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verification requires the availability of kg.
Algorithm 2 shows the verification procedure to verify a received message. The algo-
rithm is designed properly to increase the efficiency of ESPR as logical checks are usually
faster than the cryptographic operations and the symmetric-key cryptography verification
is much faster than the verification of public-key cryptography.
36
Algorithm 1 Message Transmit/Forward
Require: Valid certificate and/or Kg
1: if the message is one-hop communication then
2: Inset the vehicle’s information in source and sender
routing header’s fields
3: Reset the overhearing timer for this message, TOi=0
4: if the message is a beacon then
5: Set the control and destination fields to indicate a one-hop broadcast message
6: Insert the information required by the routing protocol (if any)
7: Insert the last known revocation process version ver
8: else
9: Insert the destination-location information extracted from the routing table
into the destination field
10: end if
11: Select a valid certificate and its corresponding private key
12: Append the certificate and a timestamp to the message
13: Sign the entire message using the private key
14: Append the signature to the message
15: else . i.e., multi-hop message
16: if the vehicle is the source of the message then
17: Get the destination’s location via location service
18: Inset the source and destination information in the immutable routing header
fields
19: Select a valid certificate and its corresponding private key
20: Append the source’s certificate and a timestamp
21: Sign the entire message except for the mutable fields using the private key
22: Append the signature to the message
23: end if
24: Insert the information of the next forwarder and a timestamp in the mutable sender
field in the routing header
25: Modify the mutable fields according to the routing protocol (if required)
26: Calculate HMAC on the mutable fields and the signature field using
the shared secret key Kg
27: Append the HMAC to the message
28: Set the overhearing timer for this message TOi
29: end if
30: Send the message
31: Run the Overhearing procedure for TOi
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Algorithm 2 Receiving a Message
Require: TA’s Public-Key and Kg (in certain cases)
1: Perform the plausibility checks as indicated in section 3.5
2: if the message does not pass the plausibility checks then
3: Drop the message
4: else
5: if the vehicle is the destination of the message then
6: Verify the source’s certificate using the TA’s public key
7: if invalid then
8: drop the message
9: else
10: Verify the source’s signature using the source’s public key
11: if invalid then
12: drop the message
13: else
14: process the message
15: end if
16: end if
17: else . i.e., the vehicle is a forwarder
18: Calculate HMAC on the mutable fields and the source’s signature using Kg
19: Compare it with the HMAC appended to the received message
20: if a mismatch occurs then
21: drop the message
22: else
23: Verify the source’s certificate using the TA’s public key
24: if invalid then
25: drop the message
26: else
27: Verify the source’s signature using the source’s public key
28: if invalid then
29: drop the message
30: else








When a compromised node is found, or a node is decided to be revoked, the TA identifies
its identity and excludes it from the system. This is usually achieved by the means of
Revocation Lists (RL), where the TA broadcasts the identities or the certificates of the
revoked nodes. Each node in the system maintains a list of the revoked nodes to avoid any
communication with them. RL management still has many open issues and challenges to
be resolved. Rrecent revocation-related studies can be adapted to complement the ESPR
scheme, e.g.,[37], [38], and [35].
In ESPR, the revocation process is triggered by the TA. Legitimate nodes report rout-
ing misbehaviour and suspicious cases to the TA. Each message includes its originators
signature and certificate so the TA is able to trace and extract the identity of the source
node. For example, when a node receives a message from a legitimate network member
with falsified information, or when it detects routing attack behaviour, it reports the sus-
picious message with any other required information to the TA. Based on some criteria,
the TA takes a revocation decision and broadcasts a revocation message.
When a legitimate node u is to be revoked, its certificates, secret keys set Ru, and Kg
must be revoked. The revocation message includes sufficient data to revoke the certificates
of u, update the common secret keys hold by the unrevoked nodes (if any), and securely
distribute a new shared secret key kg. The details and the corresponding algorithms of
keys renewal will be shown in section 3.4.
ESPR follows a probabilistic key distribution scheme to manage k′g. When a member
is to be revoked, the TA searches for M , the identity of the non-compromised secret key
kM that is shared by the majority of the unrevoked members. With the help of vj−ver, the
TA calculates the new secret key k′g, where vj is the value in the hash chain as shown in
Figure 3.2 , and ver represents the revocation version. To enable the unrevoked nodes to
update their keys and calculate the new secret key, the ESPR revocation pattern is defined
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as follow:
Kmsg = (ver||M ||IDrevkey||enckM (vj−ver)) (3.1)
where IDrevkey is a list of the identities of the revoked keys, and enckM (vj−ver) is the
symmetric encryption of vj−ver using the key kM . Therefore, the final revocation message
will be:
REVmsg = (CRL||Kmsg||SigTA) (3.2)
where CRL is a list of the certificates of the revoked nodes, and SigTA is the TA
signature on CRL||Kmsg.
3.4 ESPR: Key Management
The cryptographic operations in ESPR depend on two types of keys, symmetric and asym-
metric keys. The deployment of ESPR is mainly associated with designing an efficient
corresponding key management scheme to distribute, revoke, and update these keys. The
ESPR key management scheme is based on the traditional PKI system, where the TA issues
certificates and public-private key pairs to the network members, and broadcasts revoca-
tion messages to revoke the trust of any of them. However, ESPR justifies this process and
combines it with the management of the symmetric key kg. The management scheme can
be described via its major functions: system setup, member registration, member tracing,
membership revocation and keys update.
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3.4.1 System Setup
The TA should prepare some security material before initializing the system. First, it
defines the elliptic curve domain parameters, generates public-private key pairs, and selects
the hash function h. Then, the TA selects an initial key kg and a key pool KP = {ki|1 ≤
i ≤ l} where ki ∈ Z∗q, q is a prime number and l is a large number indicating the pool
size. The TA should also select a key pair for itself in order to sign members’ certificates.
Finally, the TA selects a secret value v and applies the hash function h j times on v to
produce a set V of hash chain values, where j is large enough to accommodate with the
number of revocation processes occuring during the life-time of the network. Algorithm 3
describes this setup phase.
3.4.2 Member Registration
To initiate the system, each member u (RSU or ORU) should register in the system and
obtain its required security materials from the TA. In this phase, the TA provides each
legitimate node with a number of certificates, kg, and a set of secret keys Ru that are
randomly chosen from the key pool KP .
For privacy purposes, the TA issues each node with a number of predetermined validity
period certificates. Each certificate includes the node’s pseudonym, a public-key Qui, a
validity period, and the TA’s signature. The TA signs each certificate using its private key
dT .
Based on the probabilistic key distribution in [39], the TA randomly assigns m secret
keys from KP to each member; thus, members share some keys. The sets of secret keys
are used to manage kg as will be shown later.
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Algorithm 3 System Setup
Require: EC Domain Parameters, Random Number Generator
1: Select random number dT
2: Set the TA private key dT
3: Select the corresponding public key QT . According to the EC domain parameters
4: for i← 1, N do . N is the number of the certificates required by the system
5: Select a random number di as a private key
6: Select the corresponding public key Qi . According to the EC domain parameters
7: end for
8: for i← 1, l do
9: Select a random number ki ∈ Z∗q, where q is a prime number
10: end for
11: Set the TA key pool KP = {ki|1 ≤ i ≤ l}
12: Select an initial secret key Kg . to be shared between all the unrevoked OBUs
13: Choose hash functions h : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗q
14: Select a secret value v ∈ Z∗q and set v◦ = v
15: for i← 1, j do . to obtain a set V of hash chain values
16: Set vi = h(vi−1)
17: end for
18: Set V = {vi|1 ≤ i ≤ j}
Algorithm 4 Member Registration
1: for all OBUu in the network, TA do
2: for i← 1,M do . M is the number of certificates allocated to each node u
3: Upload a key pair (di,Qi)
4: Prepare and sign certificate i
5: Upload the certificate i
6: end for
7: for i← 1,m do . m is the number of secret keys allocated to each node u
8: Select a random number a ∈ [1, l]
9: Upload the secret key ka ∈ KP in OBUu
10: end for
11: Upload the shared secret key kg
12: Upload the secret hash chain value vj
13: Announce the hash function h
14: end for
15: Announce the TA’s public key QT to all the OBUs
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In addition to uploading certificates and a secret keys set to each member, the TA
securely uploads kg, the hash chain value vi, the TA’s public key QT , and announces h.
Algorithm 4describes the member registration process. The procedure to follow when a
new member is joining the network during its operation is similar.
3.4.3 Member Tracing
The author considers anonymity to preserve users privacy; therfore, member tracing is a
necessity to resolve any dispute. In ESPR, any member originates a message attaches its
certificate and signs the message. The TA maintains a table that binds the real identities
to the corresponding pseudonyms. Thus, when a network member detects misbehaviour
or an authentic message containing falsified information, it simply reports the message to
the TA. The TA then traces the attached pseudonym to the certificate and identifies the
message originator.
3.4.4 Membership Revocation and Keys Updating
The revocation process is triggered by the TA when there is an OBUu to be revoked. The
certificates of OBUu must be revoked. In addition, the secret key set Ru of OBUu and Kg
are considered revoked; hence, a new secret key K 8g should be securely distributed to all
the unrevoked OBUs. Each unrevoked OBU should securely update the compromised keys
in its key sets R [39] [35]. The revocation and updating process can be described in the
following steps:
1. The TA searches its database to determine the identity (M) of the non-compromised
secret key kM that is shared by the majority of the unrevoked OBUs. The TA then
selects the value vj−ver of the hash chain values, where vj is the last value in the
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hash chain as shown in Fig. 3.2, and ver is an integer indicating the revocation
version, i.e., the number of the revocation processes performed since the network
initialization. After that the TA calculates the new secret key:
K 8g = h(Kg, vj−ver) (3.3)
Then, the TA prepares the following key update message,
Kmsg = (ver||M ||IDrevkey||enckM (vj−ver))
where IDrevkey is a list of the identities of the revoked keys, and enckM (vj−ver) is
the symmetric encryption of vj−ver using the key kM . Finally, the TA broadcasts the
following message:
REVmsg = (CRL||Kmsg ||SigTA)
where CRL is a list of the certificates of the revoked OBUs, and SigTA is the TA
signature on CRL||Kmsg .
2. After receiving REVmsg, each OBUy executes Algorithm 5 to extract the new shared
secret key and update the secret key set if necessary.
3. OBUy has to execute Algorithm 6 to get vj−ver and K
8
g. If OBUy has KM , it can
independently get vj−ver and calculate K
8
g according to step (3). Otherwise, OBUy
gets vj−ver and K
8
g from its neighboring OBUs as indicated in steps 5-13.
4. OBUy has to execute Algorithm 7 to update its key sets Ry . In step 11, ver|missed and
IDrevkey|missed denote the revocation version and the list of identities of the revoked
keys of a missed revocation process, respectively.
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Algorithm 5 Processing Revocation Messages
Require: REVmsg = (CRL||Kmsg ||SigTA)
1: Verify SigTA using the public key of the TA, QT
2: if invalid then Exit
3: else
4: Run Algorithm 6 to get vj−ver and K
8
g
5: Run Algorithm 7 to update the key set of OBUy
6: end if
7: Store ver and IDrevkey
8: Erase Kg, the hash chain values, and the original compromised secret keys.
It should be noted that ESPR enables an OBU to update its compromised keys even
if it missed revocation processes, provided that it will pick one revocation process in the
future. This is very convenient in the vehicular environment.
3.5 ESPR: Plausibility and Monitoring Checks
Plausibility checks are a set of logical tests and corresponding procedures to ensure that
the received message follows some logical rules, and the sent messages are more likely to be
delivered. The checks include tests for information plausibility in order to avoid and detect
routing attacks, and procedures in case there is a suspicion of a routing attack. Together
with the
45
Algorithm 6 Obtaining vj−ver and K
8
g
1: if kM exists in Ry then
2: Decrypt enckM (vj−ver) using kM to get vj−ver
3: Set the new secret key K 8g = h(Kg, vj−ver)
4: else




6: Start a timer T1
7: Any neighboring OBU of OBUy having vj−ver uses the public key (Qy) of OBUy ,
included in its certificate, to encrypt vj−ver||K 8g and sends them to OBUy
8: if the encrypted vj−ver is received then
9: Decrypt vj−ver||K 8g using the secret key dy corresponding to Qy to get vj−ver and
K 8g
10: else




Algorithm 7 Updating the Key Set of OBUy
Require: K 8g and vj−ver
1: if not previously missing any revocation message then
2: if possesses compromised secret keys {ki} in IDrevkey then
3: Update the secret key ki as k
8
i = h(ki, vj−ver)
4: else Exit
5: end if
6: else Set n = ver
7: while n 6= vverlast do . verlast is the last received revocation version
8: Set vj−n+1 = h(vj−n)
9: Set n = ver + 1
10: end while . this loop outputs {vj−ver+1, vj−ver+2, · · · , vverlast−1}
11: Broadcast a request to the neighboring OBUs requesting ver|missed and
IDrevkey|missed for all the missed revocation processes
12: for each received value of ver|missed do
13: Find the value of vj−ver|missed from {vj−ver+1, vj−ver+2, · · · , vverlast−1}
14: for each possessed key ki ∈ IDrevkey|missed do
15: Update the secret key ki as k
8





proposed cryptographic scheme, the set of plausibility checks support routing protocols to
avoid and detect routing attacks, and to perform well even in the presence of such attacks.
3.5.1 Spatial Checks
Spatial checks are a set of tests to be run on the received messages. In PBR, it is important
to provide correct and accurate position information in order to achieve efficient message
routing. ESPR requires each node to sign its beacons, which include its location informa-
tion. Thus, each node is responsible for providing correct position information. The set of
the proposed spatial checks are:
• Communication range: each recipient of a message must ensure that it falls within
the sender’s communication range. The distance between the sender and the recipient
at the message generating time should be plausible. Each recipient checks that:
dr − ds ≤ Cr + ε (3.4)
where dr and ds are the locations of the receiver and the sender, respectively at the
message generating time found in the timestamp field, Cr is the nominal communi-
cation range of the node in the system, and ε is the maximum possible error. Errors
include inaccuracy of a positioning system.
• Speed and density checks: In this check, the recipient ensures that the received
information follows the Greenshield’s speed-density relation[40]. In the Greenshield
model, the maximum plausible speeds for vehicles are limited by the vehicles’ density
with respect to the following relation:





where vf is the free-flow speed (i.e., the maximum speed), kj is the jam density (i.e.,
the maximum plausible density in the communication range), and k is the current
density.
The relation is adopted to check that the speed of the transmitting vehicle and the
density of the neighboring vehicles are plausible as follows: when a vehicle receives a
message, it calculates the number of its neighboring vehicles from its routing table;
then it uses eq.3.5 to calculate the plausible average speed of its neighboring vehicles
as a function of the neighboring vehicles’ density. After that, it ensures that:
vs ≤ v(k)±4 (3.6)
where vs is the speed of the sender, and 4 is a speed margin factor to accommodate
for the speed variations.
• Moved distance: The receiver of a message can check the plausibility of the moved
distance by the transmitter with respect to the last known position of the transmitter
by ensuring that:
ls2 − ls1 ≤ (ts1 − ts2).v(k) (3.7)
where ls2 is the location of the sender included in the received message, ts2 is the
timestamp included in the received message, and ls1 is the location of the sender at
time tt1 in the routing table.
• Map location: Assuming that each vehicle is equipped with a GPS receiver, the recip-
ient of a message must ensure that the location of the sender is not in an improbable
location (house, river, etc).
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3.5.2 Temporal Check
Each beacon and data packet includes a timestamp of the sending time ts. Upon receiving
a packet, each node checks that it has received the packet in reasonable time with respect
to the maximum plausible time for processing and transmitting such packets:
4t−min ≤ tr − ts ≤ 4t−max (3.8)
where tr is the receiving time, 4t−max is the maximum plausible time for one-hop packet
transmission and processing, and4t−min is the minimum delay for packet transmission and
processing. Thus, replayed messages after a certain time, and messages with timestamps
belonging to the future are detectable.
3.5.3 Strategy Check
In PBR, different protocols have different forwarding strategies. When a vehicle receives
a packet to be forwarded, it should check that it falls within a feasible forwarding region
with respect to the node’s position, the sender’s position, the destination’s position, and
any other information from the routing protocol. For example, Figure 3.5 illustrates the
feasible senders position region in which they can send a packet to recipient R in order to
deliver the packet to its destination D using the greedy routing strategy.
3.5.4 Overhearing
When a node sends a packet to be forwarded, it sets a timer and expects to hear the packet
being forwarded. If the packet is not transmitted, it re-transmits it to the next node in
the routing table, according to the forwarding strategy, and avoids sending any packet
to the suspicious node for N seconds. Packets can not be overheard for many reasons,
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Figure 3.5: Example of Sender’s Feasible Region in Gready Routing
e.g., collisions, link breakage; hence, nodes only retransmit the packets that have not been
heard, and do not immediately report the suspicious nodes to the TA.
3.5.5 Content Checks
Checking message contents in terms of duplicated or expired content will effectively preserve
the network resources. In addition, monitoring the contents in terms of message generating
rates helps to preserve bandwidth; for example, sending beacons or location inquires at
a high rate should be ignored and reported. This check will be significantly effective if
packet generating rates are defined with respect to the node’s type and application.
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3.6 Summary
In this chapter, ESPR was proposed to provide a security solution for PBR protocols.
ESPR consists of two major parts: cryptographic scheme and plausibility checks. The
cryptographic scheme deploys both symmetric and asymmetric keys, and provides a cor-
responding key distribution system. ESPR supports PBR protocols with both primary
security requirements, and robustness against defined routing attacks.
ESPR deploys the PKI system with an elliptic curve digital signature, and HMAC
function with a shared secret key between legitimate nodes, in order to secure multi-hop
communication. Every legitimate node should have a valid certificate with a corresponding
private key and an up-to-date shared secret key. Any node generates a message, including
beacons, signs the immutable fields of the message, using its private key, and attaches the
corresponding certificate. Forwarders cryptographically verify both the signature and the
HMAC value on the mutable fields, update these fields, and calculate a new HMAC value,
that replaces the previous one.
In case of revocation, the TA broadcasts a revocation message containing sufficient in-
formation to revoke the trust of the targeted node, and update the keys with the legitimate
nodes securely. Revoking the certificates is done through revocation lists. Managing the
shared key is done by a probabilistic key distribution scheme. The proposed key distri-
bution scheme is flexible with the vehicular environment; i.e., vehicles are able to update
their keys even if they have missed a number of revocation processes.
Plausibility and monitoring checks are proposed to complement the cryptographic
scheme and enable ESPR to avoid, detect, and recover from different routing attacks.
ESPR check set includes spatial checks, temporal checks, strategy checks, content checks
and overhearing procedure. These checks are run autonomously by nodes and any detected
misbehaviour is reported to the TA.
51
In conclusion, ESPR is a comprehensive security scheme to secure the different processes
of position-based routing in the context of vehicular networks. It supports one-hop and
multi-hop applications, and unicast, Geocast, and broadcast transmissions. Using sym-
metric and public key cryptography in addition to some logical checks, ESPR is capable
of avoiding, detecting and recovering from many routing attacks.
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Chapter 4
ESPR: Analysis and Performance
Evaluation
In this chapter, the proposed security scheme is evaluated analytically and through ex-
tensive simulations. A security analysis is provided with respect to a variety of network
layer attacks. In addition, the efficiency of ESPR is analyzed in terms of both bit-cost
and cryptography delay. Finally, simulation results are conducted to evaluate the system
under different scenarios and attacks.
4.1 Security Analysis
Digital signature on the generated messages guarantees authentication, data integrity, and
non-repudiation. Thus, an external attacker cannot poison routing tables by forged bea-
cons, impersonate identities of authorized members, or modify or inject packets in an unau-
thorized manner. Therefore, the delivered information from a legitimate source should be
trustworthy. Moreover, any detected misbehavior of a legitimate member is traceable and
causes trust revocation.
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Because attackers can replay authentic beacons or packets to forge legitimateness, a
combination of plausibility checks (spatial, temporal and content) verifies message fresh-
ness and prevents message duplication. Therefore, replay attacks, including replay-based
impersonation attack, are impossible.
Spatial checks effectively tighten the plausible geographical area of the claimed falsified
position and eliminate all implausible location claims. By spatial checks, the plausible
locations are reduced to some positions within the transmission range of a receiver and
restricted by the roadways of this area (in the case of vehicles). In other words, spatial
checks limit the options available, forcing a smart attacker to claim a position within a very
narrow area to fool a vehicle. However, this claim can be easily detected by other nodes
in the attackers transmission range. Thus, spatial checks are capable of detecting attacks
that depend on announcing falsified-positions, and wormhole attacks. The probability of
detecting beacons with falsified-position information is higher in dense networks.
In Sybil attacks, the attacker uses many identities simultaneously. In the case of using
predetermined validity periods in the certificates, cryptographic validation is sufficient to
detect this attack. If replaying identities is used, spatial, temporal and content checks
can overcome this attack, as mentioned. In the case of using valid and real certificates,
spatial checks by some nodes in the attacker’s transmission range can detect and report
its misbehavior and identity.
The sinkhole attack includes both the announcement of a falsified-position and selfish
behavior of packet dropping. The detection of the claimed position follows the same detec-
tion methods previously described. Moreover, the overhearing check and its corresponding
procedure are designed for the packet dropping part. However, the sinkhole attack is still
valid if the node density is very low and nodes are isolated by the network’s nature.
A routing loop can occur naturally, for a limited period of time, or intentionally by an
attacker. In the intentional routing loop attack, an attacker can either ignore the routing
54
strategy and pass the packet back to one of the previous nodes, or forge a position to first
get the packet and then forward it in order to form a loop. The misbehavior of the routing
decision is detectable by the strategy check at the recipient node. The falsified position
can be detected by spatial checks with respect to the node density. Content check prevents
endless loops and saves bandwidth.
Routing packets among legitimate members prevents external attacker from launching
routing attacks. As authentication is required to modify routing tables, packets are not
forwarded to unauthorized nodes for routing purposes. Moreover, received packets are
checked first to ensure that they have been transmitted by legitimate members. Thus,
the majority of attacks are avoided by the proposed cryptographic scheme, and the rest
of them, mostly performed by internal attackers, are handled by the proposed plausibility
checks. ESPR includes reporting detected and suspected identities to the authority, which
revokes trust from internal attackers, thereby turning them into external attackers.
Another advantage of ESPR is forward secrecy. Since the values of the hash chain,
included in the revocation messages, are released to unrevoked nodes starting from the last
value of the hash chain, and given the fact that a hash function is irreversible, a revoked
node cannot use a hash chain value vj−ver+1 received in a previous revocation process to
get the current hash chain value vj−ver . Consequently, a revoked node cannot update its
key set. In addition, a revoked node cannot get vj−ver, which is necessary to update its
key set, or K 8g from the neighboring nodes, since the revoked nodes’ certificates are in the
updated CRL, which prevents unrevoked nodes from forwarding vj−ver||K 8g to the revoked
nodes. Accordingly, ESPR guarantees forward secrecy.
55
4.2 Efficiency Analysis
In addition to securing VANETs communication, ESPR improves its efficiency. Due to the
highly dynamic nature of the VANET local topologies, a faster security scheme means a
smaller los- rate and less end-to-end delay. By decreasing the cryptography delay required
by each forwarder to verify both the originator’s signature and the sender’s signature in
the hybrid scheme [4], multi-hop routing performs better. ESPR requires each forwarder
to perform a symmetric key-based verification of the mutable fields first, only then the
originator’s signature is verified, which efficiently reduces the processing time for each
intermediate hop. Therefore, it is less likely that the messages destination will change its
location, or that the link with a neighbor will be broken.
Fast message verification protects members from some resource depletion attacks. Many
attacks exploit the verification stage of the security module and jam the network. For
example, sending forged packets at a high rate exhausts recipients’ resources in verification
processes, especially for systems with signature-based verification. Using the fast HMAC
verification significantly reduces the verification time that is required to detect dummy
packets injected by external attackers and decreases the effects of such attacks.
Packets are routed among legitimate nodes only. Members who succeed to present valid
certificates can use the network services and participate in the routing process. Therefore,
packets are more likely to be delivered. On the other hand, legitimate members who have
not updated their shared secret key kg cannot contribute in routing efficiently. In fact, this
happens with a very small probability. Since a member is connected to some other nodes,
its keys are easily updated. Moreover, unauthorized ad-hoc nodes that can participate in
routing and improving the network performance are not allowed to participate for security
purposes.
Plausibility and monitoring checks in the ESPR system assist the network to achieve
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better performance. By curtailing routing attacks, and by dropping forged, duplicated and
expired packets, ESPR conserves the network’s bandwidth for other valid packets. Fur-
thermore, the overhearing procedure helps to recover packets, in packet dropping attacks,
and increases the overall delivery rate.
4.2.1 Communication Overhead
The multi-hop communications overhead incurred due to securing the routing process is a
major evaluation metric for security schemes. In the hybrid scheme [4], the communications
overhead in each packet consists of a source node certificate, signature of the source node,
certificate of a forwarder, and signature of the forwarder on the mutable fields. In the
ESPR scheme, the communications overhead in each packet consists of a source node
certificate, signature of the source node, and an HMAC calculated by a forwarder on the
routing header. It should be noted that in the ESPR scheme there is no need to insert
any certificates for the intermediate node as the next-hop needs only the shared key Kg
to verify HMAC. Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [33] is considered
where signature consists of two elliptic curve points. ECDSA implemented on an MNT
curve [41] is considered where an elliptic curve point is represented by 160 bits. Moreover,
a certificate in IEEE1609.2 standard is 125 bytes. Moreover, Secure Hash Algorithm 1
(SHA-1) [36] is considered as the employed HMAC function, where the size of the output
hash is 160 bits. Consequently, the communications overhead incurred due to securing the
routing process in the hybrid scheme and ESPR is 330 bytes and 185 bytes, respectively.
Accordingly, the ESPR scheme decreases the incurred communications overhead by 43.9%
compared to the hybrid scheme.
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4.2.2 Cryptography Delay
The cryptography delay Tcrypt, which is defined as the incurred delay due to the performed
cryptography operations for securing the routing process, is another key metric to eval-
uate security systems. Let Tmul and Thash represent the time required to perform one
point multiplication on an elliptic curve and HMAC, respectively. In ECDSA, a certificate
verification, signature generation, and signature verification takes 2Tmul, Tmul, and 2Tmul,
respectively. In the hybrid scheme, the source has to generate two signatures, on the mu-
table fields and on the immutable fields, which takes 2Tmul. Moreover, each subsequent
node along the route has to verify the certificates and the signatures of both the source and
the previous forwarder, which takes 8Tmul in total. In addition, each intermediate node
needs Tmul to sign the mutable fields after updating it. Consequently, Tcrypt for the hybrid
scheme is (10 + 9n)Tmul, where n is the number of intermediate nodes.
In the ESPR scheme, the source has to sign the message, which requires Tmul, and
calculate HMAC on the routing header, which requires Thash. In addition, each subsequent
node in the route has to verify the certificate and the signature of the source node, verify
the received HMAC, insert the data for the next hop, and calculate HMAC on the new
data. Consequently, Tcrypt for the hybrid scheme is (5 + 4n)Tmul + 2(n+ 1)Thash.
In [42], Tmul is found for an MNT curve, using 160 bits and an embedding degree of
k = 6, equal to 0.6 msec. The Crypto++ library [43] is adpted to calculate Thash, where
it is compiled on an Intel Core2Duo 2 GHz machine. Thash for SHA-1 is 0.21 µsec. Fig.
4.1 shows the cryptography delay in msec vs. the number of intermediate nodes. It can
be seen that the ESPR scheme significantly decreases the cryptography delay compared
to that of the hybrid scheme. For example, when the number of intermediate nodes is 5,
ESPR reduces the cryptography delay by more than 50% compared to that of the hybrid
scheme.
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Figure 4.1: Cryptography Delay
4.3 Simulation-Based Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of ESPR, a VANET scenario is designed and a number of
simulations are developed. The goal of these simulations is to identify the effect of intro-
ducing ESPR on the network performance with respect to the end-to-end average delay,
the effect of the number of intermediate nodes on that delay, the effect of the presence
of some routing attacks on the network performance, and the corresponding performance
with ESPR.
The scenario under consideration is for an ad hoc network between moving vehicles.
Manhattan’s city-street map is adopted to make the model realistic; also, a map based
mobility model is applied. Vehicles are distributed randomly on the map’s roads and
they move with a maximum speed of 60km/hr toward random destinations during the
simulation time. When a vehicle reaches an intersection, it changes its direction with
probability of 0.5. The general simulation parameters are stated in Table 4.1
59
Table 4.1: General Parameters for ESPR Evaluating Simulations
Parameter Value
Simulation Duration 30 sec
Simulation Area-Map 7.4 km x 7.4 km Manhattan City
Number of Vehicles Varies
Mobility Model Map Based
Speed of vehicles 0− 60 km/hr
Transmission Range 300 m
Routing Protocol GPSR
Beacon Interval 300 msec
Antenna Omni antenna
4.3.1 End-to-End Delay
To evaluate the expected end-to-end delay for ESPR, an NS-2 [44] simulation is designed
with respect to the previous simulation parameters, in addition to the simulation param-
eters in Table 4.2. The simulation has been repeated for different node densities in the
simulation area. GPSR [10] is adopted as an example of the PBR scheme. First, the simu-
lation is performed without any security overhead or cryptographic processes delay. Then,
ESPR is considered to secure the GPSR protocol. After that, the simulation is repeated
for the hybrid scheme[4] to demonstrate the superiority of ESPR.
Table 4.2: End-to-End Delay Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Simulation software NS − 2 Release 2.34
MAC protocol IEEE 802.11
Number of vehicles 600, 1800, 2500, 3800
Mobility model Map Based, TRANS
Number of sources 10
Packet generation Constant Bit Rate (CBR)
Packet generation interval 150 msec
Packet size 500 bytes
60
In order to estimate realistic performance evaluation results, cross layer protocols and
real-word traffic models are deployed. GPSR is selected as the network layer routing
protocol, and IEEE802.11 standard is adopted as the MAC layer protocol to approximate
the IEEE 802.11p protocol. Finally, Omni antennas and 6 Mbps channel bandwidth are
considered. For the mobility model and the different traffic scenarios, TraNS (Traffic and
Network Simulation Environment) [45] is used to generate traffic scenario files compatible
with the simulator NS-2.
The simulation results for the average end-to-end delay are shown in Table 4.3 for both
ESPR and the hybrid security scheme, in addition to the average delay per packet for the
same scenario without any security consideration. It is important to mention that in these
simulations no attack is launched. The aim here is to identify the effect of the cryptography
delay on the network performance with respect to the end-to-end delay. As cryptographic
processes are performed at each intermediate node, the number of intermediate nodes has
a significant effect on the end-to-end delay. Figure 4.2 shows the average end-to-end delay
per packet in msec vs. the number of hops for GPSR, GPSR-ESPR, and GPSR-hybrid,
respectively.
Table 4.3: Simulation Results for Average End-to-End Delay




Both ESPR and hybrid security schemes affect the network’s performance in terms
of end-to-end delay. However, ESPR introduces a notably smaller effect than the hybrid
scheme. Thus, the cost to secure the multi-hop routing process in PBR is less with ESPR
in terms of cryptography delay and, accordingly, the end-to-end delay.
This criterion is very critical for some VANETs applications. For example, the max-
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Figure 4.2: Average End-to-End Delay
imum allowed end-to-end delay for some safety applications is identified to be 100 msec
[4]. In this simulation, more than 95% of the delivered packets are delivered within this
limit for ESPR, while only 85.5% of the delivered packets with the hybrid scheme meet
this constraint.
4.3.2 Resistance to Routing Attacks
A number of simulations are designed in order to evaluate the performance of the network
with the presence of some predefined routing attacks. As illustrated in 4.1, ESPR is
designed to detect and avoid most of the network layer attacks. ESPR guarantees that
sending bogus information, modifying transmitted packets, or poisoning routing tables
by external attackers are impossible. Routing loop, impersonation, sybil, and sinkhole
attacks launched by external attackers are also impossible. Thus, external attackers can
only replay legitimate packets; however, replay-based attacks, including wormhole attacks,
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are detectable by ESPR.
Internal attacker, the attacker who has valid certificates and keys, is usually capable to
launch some routing attacks. The cryptographic properties of ESPR enable the traceability
of an internal attacker who originates and injects falsified information in addition to the
detection of any multi-hop packet modification. In other routing attacks, internal attackers
announce falsified position information, drop forwarded packets, or cause routing loops.
The set of plausibility checks in ESPR are designed to detect these attacks and report the
suspicious nodes to the TA.
A set of simulation scenarios has been developed to evaluate the impact of different
routing attacks on the packet delivery rate (PDR). The same city-scenario in section 4.3 and
the general simulation parameters in Table 4.1 are considered. In this set of simulations, a
perfect wireless channel access is assumed as it is targeted to evaluate the packet loss due
to routing layer factors. The simulation parameters are listed in Table 4.4 and the full set
of simulation results are presented in Table 4.5.
Table 4.4: Parameters for The Routing Attacks Simulation
Parameter Value
Simulation software MATLAB 7.4
MAC protocol ideal
Number of vehicles 10− 100 vehicles/km2
Mobility model Map Based
Number of sources 5
Packet generation interval 150 msec
Overhearing hold interval 600 msec
Repetition 10 / scenario
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Impact of ESPR on an Attack-Free Network
In this simulation, no attack is launched in the network. The performance of the network
with the GPSR protocol is first measured by means of the packet delivery rate (PDR). Then
the performance of the network is evaluated when ESPR is implemented into the routing
protocol . Figure 4.3 shows the variance in performance between GPSR and ESPR-GPSR






















Figure 4.3: Effect of ESPR on PDR: Attack-Free Scenario
The graph shows that ESPR-GPSR outperforms GPSR in terms of PDR; the overhear-
ing procedure in ESPR gives packets new opportunities to be delivered via other paths
when they are not overheard. In an attack-free network, packets are not overheard if there
is a link-breakage, a lack of neighbours, or if a packet reaches back to the same location
that it has entered in the perimeter-mode. In this simulation, a link between two nodes
is broken if the distance between them became greater than the node’s transmission range
during the processing delay. In this scenario, the slight improvement in the network per-
formance is mainly due to the duplicated packets generated by the overhearing procedure.
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Moreover, it is important to notice that putting the suspicious nodes on hold for the time
interval specified in Table 4.4 does not degrade the PDR even with low vehicle densities.
Impact of Routing Loop Attack
In routing loop attack, an internal attacker receives a massage, updates it, and sends it
back to one of the previous forwarders (or the source) even if there is a better node in its
routing table that is available to be the next forwarder according to the routing strategy.
The aim of this attack is to delay or prevent the delivery of a massage. The attack could
also consume the bandwidth. To evaluate the impact of this attack on the network’s PDR,
a simulation scenario was designed and both GPSR and ESPR-GPSR routing were applied.
In this simulation, an attacker ignores the routing strategy and sends the packet back to its
sender. The ESPR strategy and content checks are designed to evaluate received packets
in order to detect such misbehaviour with respect to the GPSR’s routing modes. Figure
4.4 and 4.5 show the simulation results for the impact routing loop attacks have on an
unsecured network with diffrent proportions of attackers, and the corresponding impact
when ESPR is incorporated into the routing protocol, respectively.
Impact of Sinkhole Attack
In a sinkhole attack, an internal attacker convinces other nodes to be their next hop
forwarder by announcing a different location in its beacon messages; it then drops any
received message in a selfish behaviour. The impact of sinkhole attacks on the network
performance includes both poisoning the routing tables of the attacker’s neighbours and
dropping their packets. A sinkhole attacker can be rational or irrational according to its
motive. Rational sinkhole attackers aim to grab other node packets to analyze them. For





















































Figure 4.5: ESPR Resistance to Routing Loop Attack
extract important payment information. On the other hand, irrational sinkhole attackers
aim to disturb the network operation.
Two sets of simulations are developed to evaluate the impact of sinkhole attacks. In
the first set, a proportion of the scenario’s nodes are selected to be the attackers. Each
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attacker claims random locations in its beacon messages and drops any received message.
In the second set of simulations, the attack is designed in such a way that the attacker
claims a plausible location located on the road map and within its transmission range. The
claimed location was designed to be ahead of the real attacker’s location by the value R/2
in its movement direction, where R is the transmission range. This attack is referred to as
smart sinkhole attack.
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the PDR for scenarios involved simple sinkhole attack and
smart sinkhole attack, respectively. It can be seen that the simple sinkhole attack affects the
PDR of the network more than the smart sinkhole attack. By claiming farther distances,
the simple sinkhole attackers are able to convince more nodes to be their next hop; the
smart sinkhole attackers limit their location options in order to be plausible.
Vehicles with ESPR plausibility check set are able to detect sinkhole attacks au-
tonomously and maintain the PDR of the network. Figure 4.8 shows the corresponding
network PDR when ESPR is implemented into the routing protocol. The GPSR-ESPR
curve is very close to the attack-free PDR curve, with respect to losing 15% of the vehicles
due to their uncooperative behaviour.
Impact of Wormhole Attack
In a wormhole attack, two or more attackers are connected via a private high speed link
and they resend messages heard in one terminal into the other terminal(s). Replaying
authentic beacons from different locations enables attackers to dominate the routing paths.
Wormhole attackers connect the network via their private connection, which may improve
the network’s performance as if RSUs have been used for this purpose. However, the
attackers aim is to dominate the connection so they can eavesdrop or partition the network.
The first simulation set is designed to evaluate the network’s PDR when attackers


















































Figure 4.7: Impact of the Smart Sinkhole Attack
attackers’ transmission range hear authentic beacons from different sites; thus, have larger
routing tables. When a node sends a packet to another node in its routing table but
not within its transmission range, the packet will be replayed in the other sites by the



























Figure 4.8: ESPR Resistance to Sinkhole Attack
attack on the PDR. This attack has to be detected and avoided in order to avoid both
packet analysis and network congestions. Figure 4.10 shows the corresponding PDR when


























Figure 4.9: Impact of the Wormhole Attack



























Figure 4.10: ESPR Resistance to Wormhole Attack
replaying beacon messages and dropping other packets. Figure 4.11 shows the effect of this
attack on an unsecured network. Figure 4.12 shows the corresponding PDR when ESPR is






















































Figure 4.12: The ESPR Resistance to Wormhole Attack with Packet Dropping
Table 4.5: The Results of Routing Attacks Simulations
Attack Proportion
PDR ( % )/ Node Density (v/km2)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Attacks-free 34.6 76.1 90.5 98.9 100 99.9 100 100 100 100
Sinkhole
5% 29.3 59.9 91.1 98.4 99.5 100 100 99.9 100 100
15% 29.3 56.9 80.8 96.3 98 99.9 99.6 100 99.9 100
30% 40.3 47.9 69.8 84.8 94.6 97.6 99.1 99.8 99.9 100
Smart
Sinkhole
5% 34.5 69.3 92.4 97.5 98.7 99.9 100 100 100 100
15% 22.7 66.7 86.9 96.2 98.9 99.4 99.6 99.9 100 100
30% 23.8 45.3 77.5 88.9 94.1 99.1 98.8 99.5 99.9 100
Wormhole
5% 36.2 66.3 83.1 93.6 97.2 97.8 97.2 98 95.8 97
15% 35.8 56.2 83.8 82.8 90.4 96.1 93.9 96.3 95.2 95.3




5% 44.6 73 90.8 96 98.5 99.4 99.1 99 98.3 99
15% 36.8 57.5 80.6 91.9 96.1 97.1 96.1 98 95.8 98
30% 31.6 81.5 85.2 92.9 94 95.2 95.7 95.9 96.1 97.2
Routing loop
5% 32.1 73 88.7 97.6 99.9 98.9 100 99.9 100 100
15% 32.4 62.3 83.8 96.8 98.8 99.3 99.9 100 100 100
30% 30.2 62.5 81.3 95 97.9 99.4 99.7 99.7 99.9 100
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4.3.3 Discussion
All the conducted simulation results support the analysis provided in previous sections.
The results show that ESPR secures PBR at the cost of some extra end-to-end delay.
ESPR is capable of detecting and recovering from routing attacks, even when the attackers
are internal.
In the first simulation environment, a realistic scenario with cross-layer standards was
applied to precisely identify end-to-end delay. Cryptographic processes, applied at each
intermediate node, result in a major increase to the end-to-end delay; however, this delay is
less than the delay resulting from other schemes to achieve the same level of security. The
analysis shows that ESPR decreases the cryptography delay by half compared to the hybrid
scheme’s cryptography delay, and the simulation results support that. The results also show
a relation between the number of intermediate nodes involved in delivering a packet, and the
average end-to-end delay: increasing the number of intermediate forwarders significantly
increases the average end-to-end delay. The designed simulation considered the worst case
in terms of the involved intermediate forwarders to deliver packets in the Manhattan-city
model, as it did not employ any fixed infrastructure to connect the network.
The second simulation environment was designed to evaluate the PDR of the network
in the presence of routing attacks. Routing attacks threaten the network performance
even with the presence of a cryptographic security scheme. The simulation considered the
normal behaviour of well-known attacks. Neither of the simulation scenarios considered
attackers with directional antennas or cooperative sinkhole attackers.
The overhearing procedure was designed in such a way that the node retransmits the
packet to the next forwarder in its routing table if the transmission of the packet was not
detected from the current forwarder. Then, the sender puts the suspicious nodes on hold
for a predefined time interval, i.e., the sender does not consider the suspicious node for
routing purposes for a period of time. In some cases, a packet is dropped due to a routing
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decision, and then another version of the packet is transmitted. Therefore, overhearing
slightly improves PDR at the cost of injecting redundant packets to the network. Packets
are retransmitted until reaching their destinations or expiry time. The hold interval, the
impacts of the redundant packets, and the packets life-time are important issues in the
proposed overhearing scheme; they need to be studied and optimized.
Although the results indicate high PDR in ESPR, it is expected that ESPR has better
performance in a real life setting. The simulation scenarios only considered autonomous
detection of attackers. When a node detects a malicious behaviour, e.g., a legitimate node
claiming a falsified-position, the detector avoids cooperation with this node. The rest of
the ESPR procedure was not considered in the simulation. The detector should report
misbehaviour to the TA, then the TA have to send a revocation message to alert all the
legitimate nodes about an attacker’s identity. Thus, the real scenario leads to a faster
adversaries’ disclosure and a better PDR. The time taken to detect an attacker, report its
behaviour, and distribute a revocation message was also not considered in this simulation.
Section 4.3.2 presents the impact of different routing attacks on a PBR-based VANET.
The simulation scenario is under the assumption that the network is secured by crypto-
graphic means and that the attackers are internal. The set of simulations are designed to
emphasize the importance of the plausibility checks in ESPR. The results show that the
PDR is significantly decreased when there is an absence of plausibility checks. The worm-
hole attack with packet dropping behaviour has the worst PDR, because the attackers use
many legitimate beacons to fool their neighbours. Routing loop attack has the least im-
pact on PDR, because it does not include falsified-position information or packet dropping
behaviour in the designed scenario. Wormhole attack remarkably increases the PDR as it
connects the network; however, this improvement should be done in a formal scheme and
not by anonymous attackers. For example, similar improvement can be achieved by using
fixed RSUs as gateways to the infrastructure, under the supervision of the TA.
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The results also show the resistance of ESPR’s plausibility checks to different routing
attacks. The PDR is closly resembles the attack-free scenario in most cases, taking into
consideration losing a portion of the network density. The wormhole scenarios have a
slightly lower PDR, this is because nodes detect beacons with implausible locations in their
transmission range. Thus, detecrors stop cooperation with the suspicious nodes for the rest
of the simulation interval. The effect increases with longer simulation time. However, nodes
should report these suspicious beacons to the TA and wait for the revocation messages.
The TA will be able to recognize the wormhole attack according to the reported messages.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, the proposed ESPR was evaluated in terms of security and bit-size. The
proposed cryptography scheme supports the network through primary security require-
ments. The corresponding key management scheme guarantees secure delivery of the re-
quired security materials and forward secrecy. This chapter included detailed analysis of
the communication overhead and the cryptography delay added by ESPR, in addition to
a simulation-based evaluation.
Table 4.6 summarizes the ESPR resistance to the different routing attacks delivered
by analysis and simulation results. Impossible attack means that ESPR guarantees the
detection of it autonomously. Detectable attacks can be discovered by some nodes in the
network; autonomous detection by all nodes is not guaranteed. When an attacker has been
detected and reported, the TA broadcasts a revocation message to disclose its identity. The
simulation results show that ESPR enables the network member to detect routing attacks
and maintain a high PDR.
ESPR provides the required security for the network on the cost of some cryptographic
operations and logical checks. The cryptographic operations introduce both processing
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Table 4.6: Parameters for The Routing Attacks Simulation
Attack External Internal
Injuction of bogus information Impossible Traceable
Payload modification Impossible Impossible
Identity impersonation Impossible Impossible
Replay Detectable Detectable
Routing loop Impossible Detectable




delay and communication overhead. The overhead incurred by ESPR is 185 bytes, which
is 43.9% less than the corresponding overhead incurred by the hybrid scheme, that provides
the same level of security. Moreover, the cryptography delay introduced by ESPR is lower
compared to that of the hybrid scheme. The simulation results support our analysis.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
The conducted research of this thesis is summarized and concluded in this chapter, followed
by the future work.
5.1 Summary
ESPR is a novel security scheme developed by the author to secure PBR protocols in
the VANETs context. In PBR, vehicles cooperate to deliver the network packets using
distributed routing, where routing decisions are taken by intermediate forwarders with re-
spect to the location of the forwarder, its neghbouring nodes and the destination vehicle.
Securing PBR protocols requires both hop-by-hop and end-to-end security. ESPR guar-
antees originator authentication, data integrity, and end-to-end non-repudiation through
its cryptographic scheme. In ESPR, each message originator signs the message with its
private key. In multi-hop applications, legitimate forwarders update the mutable fields of
a message and recalculate HMAC value using a shared secret key. Each recipient verifies
the HMAC value, and then the originator’s signature.
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ESPR uses a novel key management system to manage the distribution, revocation,
and key renewal processes. PKI with ECDSA is applied as a public key environment. A
probabilistic key distribution is also applied with a hash chain-based technique to manage
the symmetric shared key. The proposed scheme guarantees secure key management and
forward secrecy.
ESPR also defines a set of plausibility checks that enable vehicles to detect and avoid
routing attacks. The checks are run autonomously and the detection is not fully guaranteed;
however, the analysis and the simulation results conclude a high detection level.
Both analysis and simulation results demonstrate that ESPR outperforms its counter-
parts. The reduction in the cryptographic processes at each intermediate node significantly
reduces the end-to-end delay required to deliver a message. Moreover, the bit-size added by
ESPR for security purposes is noticeably small in respect to the provided level of security.
5.2 Contributions
The major contributions of this thesis can be summarized as follows:
• PBR attacks have been studied. Some of these attacks have been implemented and
simulated in a VANET environment, and their impact on the packet delivery rate
(PDR) has been studied.
• A cryptographic scheme has been proposed to secure PBR protocols. This scheme
has less cryptography delay and less communication overhead than its counterparts
that have equal security strength.
• A key management scheme has been proposed to manage the required keys by ESPR.
This scheme describes the security materials required and the techniques applied to
maintain the operation of ESPR.
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• A set of plausibility checks has been proposed. This set includes applying the Green-
shield model to the location verification problem.
5.3 Future Work
ESPR introduces significant progress to the security of PBR in VANETs; however, this
field still requires more research. In following, several issues are provided to further enhance
the field.
Impact of privacy solutions on PBR
For privacy purposes, vehicles chance their identities frequently. This affects the perfor-
mance of PBR-based systems. The impact of changing vehicles identities on the network
performance need to be studied in order to optimize the life-time of each identity, in case
of using multiple anonymous identities, or find new privacy solutions that perform well
with the PBR context.
Optimization issues for the overhearing procedure
In ESPR, nodes keep track of their packets’ transmission by the next forwarders. When a
node does not detect the transmission, it avoids sending messages to that node for a period
of time, and retransmits the packet to another forwarder instead. This procedure needs
an extensive study. The hold period can be optimized for better system performance. In
addition, the impact of retransmission on the network needs to be investigated. The study
may consider many factors such as node density and network congestions.
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Resistance to signature jamming attacks
ESPR can easily detect and avoid the signature jamming attack (SJA) because it first ver-
ifies the HMAC value. This attack was not considered in this thesis. Further investigation
on SJA, and corresponding resistance of ESPR are feasible.
Adaptive ESPR
In ESPR, the major end-to-end delay is consumed to verify the source’s signature. As
ESPR introduces another level of trust, having the shared secret key, intermediate nodes
in multi-hop packets can verify an originator’s signature with a variable probability. Thus,
the end-to-end delay will significantly be reduced. As a forwarder does not obtain any
information from the forwarded packets, the network is vulnerable only to packet injection
attack by internal adversaries. Thus, the probability of verification can be related to the
traffic density in the network and the detection of attackers.
Improved GSIS for PBR
In GSIS [26], the authors propose group signature and identity-based signature to meet
the security requirements and reduce the cryptography overhead. However, GSIS does
not consider the multi-hop problem or protect the network from the routing attacks. The
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